Wednesday, February 20, 2013

The Big Lie

Anyone wanting to know how the Obama team uses The Big Lie technique to influence public opinion needs go no further than this quote by David Axelrod on the Fox News Network interview:


On Fox News Sunday Axelrod was asked about the attack on Americans in Benghazi, Libya, on September 11, 2012.  Axelrod stated:
[I]mmediately when word of the attack came, the president was meeting with his top national security folks.  He was talking to them well into the night.  He was in touch with them, during the day, as -- during the next day as well.  [snip]
[E]verything -- everything was put in motion, that he could put in motion.  Everything -- every conversation that needed to be had was being had between him and his top national security officials.
Now is there anyone in America unaware of the fact that Secretary of Defense Panetta and the Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staffs both stated under oath that they had spoken with Obama  one time and one time only, very briefly, on the day of the Benghazi attack at 5 PM and never talked to him again the rest of the evening, nor did they speak with anyone from the WH again that day or evening?  Unfortunately criminals have no shame or qualms about lying, using it as a tactic to further their agenda.  This particular lie was two days before the general election obviously designed to deflect any criticism of Obama's handling of this crises.  

Tuesday, February 19, 2013

Economics illiteracy is killing us

Ignorance of how the free market economy works, especially among elected officials, is at the root of most of our current employment shortfall.  Obama continues to demonstrate his ignorance by ignoring the past and by quoting the failed nostrums of Keynesians like Paul Krugman.  When will liberals learn?  That is the real question and it appears to some that they really don't want to learn for fear that the real solutions would mean they lose control of political power levers and when that happens they lose control of the ability to buy votes.  The bottom line is that the less government interference in the free markets, the more those markets grow in size and create economic activity that in turn creates employment opportunities.  It's hard to have it both ways:  it is not possible to have an economy in which the government grows beyond a given point and at the same time have a growing private sector that creates more and more jobs.  We have reached that point, as have the european countries, when taxes, regulations and nonproductive government programs stifle business innovation and the ability of entrepreneurs to create wealth.  At this point in time we are using up the wealth created in the past and not creating new wealth sufficient to grow our economy.  Until we have an administration that understands these issues we are going to have high unemployment and a steady deterioration of our standard of living.



In Praise of Income Inequality

You cannot make the poor richer by making the rich poorer.
One month into the second term of the Obama administration, the economic prognosis looks mixed at best. On growth, the U.S. Department of Commerce reports the last quarter of 2012 produced a small decline in gross domestic product, without any prospects for a quick reversal. On income inequality, the most recent statistics (which only go through 2011) focus on the top 1 percent.
“Incomes Flat in Recovery, But Not for the 1%” reports Annie Lawrey of the New York Times. Relying on a recent report prepared by the well-known economist Professor Emmanuel Saez, who is the director for the Center of Equitable Growth at Berkeley, Lawrey reports that the income of the top 1 percent has increased by 11.2 percent, while the overall income of the rest of the population has decreased slightly by 0.4 percent.
  epstein  
  Illustration by Barbara Kelley
Growth vs. Equality
What should we make of these numbers? One approach is to stress the increase in wealth inequality, deploring the gains of the top 1 percent while lamenting the decline in the income of the remainder of the population. But this approach is only half right. We should be uneasy about any and all income declines, period. But, by the same token, we should collectively be pleased by increases in income at the top, so long as they were not caused by taking, whether through taxation or regulation, from individuals at the bottom.
This conclusion rests on the notion of a Pareto improvement, which favors any changes in overall utility or wealth that make at least one person better off without making anyone else worse off. By that measure, there would be an unambiguous social improvement if the income of the wealthy went up by 100 percent so long as the income of those at the bottom end did not, as a consequence, go down. That same measure would, of course, applaud gains in the income of the 99 percent so long as the income of the top 1 percent did not fall either.
This line of thought is quite alien to thinkers like Saez, who view the excessive concentration of income as a harm even if it results from a Pareto improvement. Any center for “equitable growth” has to pay as much attention to the first constraint as it does to the second. Under Saez’s view of equity, it is better to narrow the gap between the top and the bottom than to increase the overall wealth.
To see the limits of this reasoning, consider two hypothetical scenarios. In the first, 99 percent of the population has an average income of $10 and the top 1 percent has an income of $100. In the second, we increase the income gap. Now, the 99 percent earn $12 and the top 1 percent earns $130. Which scenario is better?
This hypothetical comparison captures several key points. First, everyone is better off with the second distribution of wealth than with the first—a clear Pareto improvement. Second, the gap between the rich and the poor in the second distribution is greater in both absolute and relative terms.
The stark challenge to ardent egalitarians is explaining why anyone should prefer the first distribution to the second. Many will argue for some intermediate solution. But how much wealth are they prepared to sacrifice for the sake of equality? Beyond that, they will have a hard time finding a political mechanism that could achieve a greater measure of equality and a program of equitable growth. The public choice problems, which arise from self-interested intrigue in the political arena, are hard to crack.
These unresolved tensions are revealed by looking at a passage from Saez’s report Striking it Richer. Saez is largely indifferent to these problems of implementation when he observes ominously that
falls in income concentration due to economic downturns are temporary unless drastic regulation and tax policy changes are implemented and prevent income concentration from bouncing back. Such policy changes took place after the Great Depression during the New Deal and permanently reduced income concentration until the 1970s. In contrast, recent downturns, such as the 2001 recession, lead to only very temporary drops in income concentration.
The policy changes that are taking place coming out of the Great Recession (financial regulation and top tax rate increase in 2013) are not negligible but they are modest relative to the policy changes that took place coming out of the Great Depression. Therefore, it seems unlikely that US income concentration will fall much in the coming years.
Let’s unpack this. It is surely true that the top 1 percent (or at least the top 1 percent of that 1 percent) is heavily invested in financial instruments, and thus will suffer a decline in income with the regulation of the financial markets. But by the same token, it would be absurd to praise any declines in overall capital wealth because of its supposed contribution to greater equality for all individuals. Nor would it make any sense to describe, as Saez does, the current situation as one of “booming stock-prices” when the Dow Jones Industrial Average still teeters below its 2007 high. Take into account inflation and one finds that the real capital stock of the United States has actually declined over the last six years, which reduces the wealth available to create private sector jobs.
Nor, moreover, is there anything permanent about the 2012 gain in income at the top. As Saez himself notes, some portion of the recent income surge has resulted from a “re-timing of income,” by which high-income taxpayers accelerate income to 2012 to avoid the higher 2013 tax rates. Accordingly, we can expect that real incomes at the top will be lower in 2013 than otherwise would have been the case. Indeed, it is possible that these “modestly” higher taxes could produce the worst of both worlds, by depressing government revenues and reducing the income of the rich.
Saez’s own qualification is best read as a backhanded recognition of the perverse incentives that rapid changes in the tax structure create. It is a pity that he does not go one step further to accept the sound position that low, flat, and steady tax rates offer the only way—the only equitable way—to sustainable overall growth.
A Return to the New Deal?
Unfortunately, Saez would rather move our system precisely in the opposite direction. He praises the dramatic shifts that took place during the Great Depression, when marginal tax rates at the federal level reached 62 percent under Hoover’s Revenue Act of 1932, and stayed high during Roosevelt’s New Deal period. The anemic economic performance of the Roosevelt New Deal arose in large part from a combination of high taxation and destructive national policies that strangled free trade, increased union power, and reduced overall agricultural production. Today, Saez concentrates on the income growth of the top 1 percent. He does not address the feeble levels of economic growth over the last five years.
Saez may think that the latest round of tax increases and financial regulations are “modest” in the grand scheme of things. But their effects have been predictable. The declines in productivity have translated into lower levels of income and well-being for all affected groups.
The blunt truth remains that any government-mandated leveling in society will be a leveling down. There is no sustainable way to make the poor richer by making the rich poorer. But increased regulation and taxation will make both groups poorer. Negative growth hardly becomes equitable if a larger fraction of the decline is concentrated at the top earners.
The Middle Class and the Minimum Wage
The effort to promote equitable growth at the expense of the top 1 percent has serious consequences for current policy. It is no accident that in his recent State of the Union Address, President Obama once again called for increases in taxes on “the wealthiest and the most powerful.” If adopted, these changes would make the tax system more progressive and the economy more sluggish.
Indeed the President goes further. He pushes for the adoption of other wrong-headed policies that would also hurt the very people whom they are intended to help. Consider that the Lowrey story featured a picture of President Obama appearing before a crowd at the Linamar Corporation in Arden, N.C., seeking to make good on his promise to raise the minimum wage to $9.00—to advance, of course, the interests of the middle class to whom the President pays undying allegiance.
The President thinks he can redistribute income without stifling economic growth. The simple rules of supply and demand dictate that any increase in the minimum wage that expands the gap between the market wage and the statutory wage will increase the level of unemployment. The jobs that potential employees desperately need will disappear from the marketplace. In a weak economy, a jump in the minimum wage is likely, as the Wall Street Journalhas noted, to reduce total jobs, with unskilled minority workers bearing the brunt of the losses.
Unfortunately, the President displays his resolute economic ignorance by proclaiming, “Employers may get a more stable workforce due to reduced turnover and increased productivity.” But they can get that stability benefit unilaterally, without new legislation that throttles other employers for whom the proposition is false. Only higher productivity secures long-term higher wages.
Indeed, the best thing the President could do is to just get out of the way. After over four years of his failed policies,Mortimer Zuckerman reports that unemployment rates still hover at 8 percent, and 6.4 million fewer people have jobs today than in 2007. That’s an overall jobs decline of 4.9 percent in the face of a population growth of 12.5 million people from July 2007 to July of 2012. The same period has registered sharp increases in the number of people on disability insurance (to 11 million people) and food stamps (to some 48 million).
There is a deep irony in all of these dismal consequences. The President’s State of the Union Address targeted the plight of the middle class. That appeal always makes political sense—but it also makes for horrific economic policy. All too often, the calls for equitable growth yield anything but the desired outcome.
Rather than focus on “equitable growth,” the President should focus on flattening the income tax and deregulating labor markets. Today’s constant emphasis on progressive taxation and government intervention in labor markets will continue to lead the country, especially the middle class, on a downward path.

Richard A. Epstein, the Peter and Kirsten Bedford Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution, is the Laurence A. Tisch Professor of Law, New York University Law School, and a senior lecturer at the University of Chicago. His areas of expertise include constitutional law, intellectual property, and property rights. His most recent books are Design for Liberty: Private Property, Public Administration, and the Rule of Law (2011), The Case against the Employee Free Choice Act (Hoover Press, 2009) and Supreme Neglect: How to Revive the Constitutional Protection for Private Property (Oxford Press, 2008).

Monday, February 18, 2013

Repeating past mistakes


As is apparent from this analysis, everything done by Obama's administration to counter recessions, has been counter productive.  This is a shame, as the explanation of all this has been available for some time.

Recessions: The Don't Do List

Mises Daily: Sunday, February 17, 2013 by 
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Listening to a new report on the just-released GDP numbers while reading Rothbard’s America’s Great Depression (AGD) made me realize how relevant and important this work is relative to today’s poorly performing economy. The book briefly summarizes Austrian Business Cycle Theory (ABCT) and applies the theory to the period of the Great Depression from 1929–1933. The book is especially relevant in that it provides policy guidance for dealing with an economic crisis, based on ABCT and historical evidence. The policy recommendations include actions to avoid as well as positive actions government could undertake to speed recovery. Unfortunately, the official reaction to the present crisis has been a virtual match to Rothbard’s “don’t do” list, while the positive actions have been conspicuous by their absence in most mainstream policy discussions. Even more important moving forward is the need for monetary reform, which is the key to preventing boom-bust cycles and thus avoiding depressions.
Preliminary GDP numbers for 4th quarter 2012 were just released and, as reported by the Wall Street Journal, indicated that the “[r]ecovery shows a soft spot” with GDP declining 0.1%. As Jeffrey Tucker reports in “The GDP Shock”:
Hardly anyone anticipated this. USA Today and other purportedly reliable venues immediately assured the world that this does not mean recession. Somehow after hanging onto to GDP numbers for three years—recovery is here despite your internal sense that the economy is still in a ditch—now we are told that the GDP figures are really just misleading. Recovery is still here, says the mainstream press.
Jon Hilsenrath in “Unusual Quarter of Contraction Doesn’t Mean Recession” provides a toned-down example of what Tucker is talking about:
A one quarter contraction of economic output doesn’t mean the economy is formally in recession, but it is unusual for such contractions to happen in the middle of economic expansions.
Austrian economists are keenly aware that “GDP figures are really just misleading.” Inclusion of government spending in any measure of economic growth is misleading. Business cycles are characterized by greater fluctuations in the capital goods industries relative to consumer goods. Malinvestment during the boom is followed by capital restructuring during the depression/recovery. Maintaining a coordinated structure of production is essential for maintaining a given level of prosperity, and lengthening the structure is a necessary condition for an improvement in the material standard of living. When one fully incorporates capital theory into macroeconomic analysis, it becomes clear that consumption is not the “engine of the economy” (see John Papola’s “Think Consumption Is The ‘Engine’ Of Our Economy? Think Again” in Forbes online, or Mark Skousen’s“Gross Domestic Expenditures (GDE): the Need for a New National Aggregate Statistic”). Per Rothbard (Americas Great Depression, pp. 58–59):
Savings, which go into investment, are therefore just as necessary to sustain the structure of production as consumption. Here we tend to be misled because national income accounting deals solely in net terms. Even “gross national product” is not really gross by any means; only gross durable investment is included, while gross inventory purchases are excluded. It is not true, as the underconsumptionists tend to assume, that capital is invested and then pours forth onto the market in the form of production, its work over and done. On the contrary, to sustain a higher standard of living, the production structure—the capital structure—must be permanently “lengthened.” As more and more capital is added and maintained in civilized economies, more and more funds must be used just to maintain and replace the larger structure. This means higher gross savings, savings that must be sustained and invested in each higher stage of production.
Even though GDP is a highly inaccurate measure of economic activity, and regardless of whether or not one quarter of negative growth in real GDP indicates an economy on the verge of a double dip recession, the number does provide further evidence of an economy struggling to recover from the depression which followed back-to-back Fed induced boom-bust cycles. This is an economy which has been essentially stagnating since the reported end of the “Great Recession” in June 2009, nearly four years ago.
Mainstream economists have given competing explanations of why this is the worst recovery since the Great depression. Many Keynesians, including Paul Krugman, have argued the recovery is slow, not because the policy response was wrong, but because it was not big enough. The policy response was strong enough to save the economy from a bigger disaster, but despite an $800 billion fiscal stimulus, deficits of over one trillion dollars leading to a public debt of over $16 trillion, and a tripling of the Fed’s balance sheet, the policy response was still too small. Carmen M. Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff, also defend the policy response, but in This Time is Different, they argue that recoveries from recessions accompanied by a financial crisis have, based on historical evidence, always been slow compared to recessions not accompanied by financial crisis. While fiscal and monetary stimuli have not generated a speedy recovery, these policies did prevent the crisis from being even worse. According to Rana Foroohar in Time, “The Risks of Reviving a Revived Economy” [HT to Walter Block]:
Ironically, the stimulus is also a reason the recovery has been so slow and will continue to be for the next three to five years. Harvard economist Ken Rogoff, who along with his colleague Carmen Reinhart has been the best rune reader of the past few years, says that historically during financial crises, “to the extent that you act to slow the deep, sharp economic pain, you also slow the recovery.”
Contra Rogoff and Reinhart, Michael Bordo has done some excellent work showing that throughout US economic history, recovery has actually been quicker following financial crises. His work has been used by John B. Taylor to bolster his argument that policy activism and the accompanying policy uncertainty, both monetary and fiscal, have impeded business planning and recovery. Much of the debate can be accessed here. Austrian economists like Robert Higgs and myself and fellow travelers such as Mary L. G. Theroux have pushed the uncertainty argument even further to include regime uncertainty as the key element retarding recovery.
However, readers of Rothbard’s America’s Great Depression should not have been surprised that the recent bust was not a sharp depression followed quickly by a return to prosperity and sustainable growth, albeit not necessarily to the levels expected by those fooled by the false expectations created by monetary mismanagement due to malinvestments and wealth destruction during the previous two booms (see Salerno’s “A Reformulation of Austrian Business Cycle Theory in Light of the Financial Crisis,” Ravier’s “Rethinking Capital-Based Macroeconomics,” and most recently Shostak’s“Fed’s policies expose mainstream fallacies”). While the first part of Rothbard’s great book is devoted to explaining the Austrian boom-bust theory of the business cycle, defending the theory from critics, and illustrating its applicability to the events leading up to the 1929 crisis/bust, the second part of the book is devoted to examining governmental interventions and policy errors that retarded recovery and turned a “garden variety recession” into a Great Depression.
Rothbard notes two things of significance for both then and now:
1. “[T]he longer the boom goes on the more wasteful the errors committed, and the longer and more severe will be the necessary depression readjustment” (p. 13). The current boom-bust had its roots in the boom during the late 1990s, which resulted in a bust/recession, recovery from which was aborted by aggressive Fed action beginning in 2003, which added new malinvestments and misdirections of production to the unresolved malinvestments left over from the previous boom (see Cochran’s “Hayek and the 21st Century Boom-Bust and Recession-Recovery”).
2. Unemployment, if recovery is not impeded by interventions, will be temporary. Per Rothbard (p. 14):
Since factors must shift from the higher to the lower orders of production, there is inevitable “frictional” unemployment in a depression, but it need not be greater than unemployment attending any other large shift in production. In practice, unemployment will be aggravated by the numerous bankruptcies, and the large errors revealed, but it still need only be temporary. The speedier the adjustment, the more fleeting will the unemployment be. Unemployment will progress beyond the “frictional” stage and become really severe and lasting only if wage rates are kept artificially high and are prevented from falling. If wage rates are kept above the free-market level that clears the demand for and supply of labor, laborers will remain permanently unemployed. The greater the degree of discrepancy, the more severe will the unemployment be.
When the crisis hit in 2007 and 2008, the correct policy would have been the response Rothbard recommended in 1982 in the introduction to the fourth edition (p. xxi) of America’s Great Depression:
The only way out of the current mess is to “slam on the brakes,” to stop the monetary inflation in its tracks. Then, the inevitable recession will be sharp but short and swift[emphasis added], and the free market, allowed its head, will return to a sound recovery in a remarkably brief time.
While, as mentioned above, Rothbard only briefly discusses ABCT (p. xxxviii), “a full elaboration being available in other works,” AGD, elaborates on the theory’s implication on government policy: “implications which run flatly counter to prevailing views [both then, 1963, and now].”
What are these implications? First and foremost (p. 19), “don’t interfere with the market’s adjustment process” [emphasis original]. The more government blocks market adjustments, the “longer and more grueling the depression will be, and the more difficult will be the road to complete recovery.” Rothbard argues it is possible to logically list the ways market adjustment could be aborted by government action and such a list would coincide well with the “favorite ‘anti-depression’ arsenal of government policy.” The list almost perfectly matches with policy responses to the crisis during both the Bush (see Thornton’s “Hoover, Bush, and Great Depressions”) and Obama administrations.
Here is Rothbard’s “Don't Do” list (pp. 19–20), with my comments in brackets:

1. Prevent or delay liquidation

“Lend money to shaky businesses, call on banks to lend further, etc.” [Done. Tarp, auto bailouts, and the Fed’s mondustrial policy. See recently John B. Taylor in the Wall Street Journal: “The low rates also make it possible for banks to roll over rather than write off bad loans, locking up unproductive assets.”]

2. Inflate further

“Further inflation blocks the necessary fall in prices, thus delaying adjustment and prolonging depression. Further credit expansion creates more malinvestments, which, in their turn, will have to be liquidated in some later depression. A government ‘easy money’ policy prevents the market's return to the necessary higher interest rates.” [Done in spades.]

3. Keep wage rates up

“Artificial maintenance of wage rates in a depression insures permanent mass unemployment. Furthermore, in a deflation, when prices are falling, keeping the same rate of money wages means that real wage rates have been pushed higher. In the face of falling business demand, this greatly aggravates the unemployment problem.”

4. Keep prices up

“Keeping prices above their free-market levels will create unsalable surpluses, and prevent a return to prosperity.” [3 and 4 are both direct results of current Fed actions, including price inflation targets near 2%.]

5. Stimulate consumption and discourage saving

“We have seen that more saving and less consumption would speed recovery; more consumption and less saving aggravate the shortage of saved-capital even further. Government can encourage consumption by ‘food stamp plans’ and relief payments. It can discourage savings and investment by higher taxes, particularly on the wealthy and on corporations and estates. As a matter of fact, any increase of taxes and government spending will discourage saving and investment and stimulate consumption, since government spending is all consumptionSome of the private funds would have been saved and invested; all of the government funds are consumed. Any increase in the relative size of government in the economy, therefore, shifts the societal consumption-investment ratio in favor of consumption, and prolongs the depression.” [The federal government has expanded from a bloated 18–20% of the economy to 23–25% of the economy under the current administration. The Bush fiscal stimulus in 2008 and the majority of the 2009 Obama stimulus supported consumption relative to investment as did the ineffective recently repealed temporary payroll tax cut.]

6. Subsidize unemployment

“Any subsidization of unemployment (via unemployment ‘insurance,’ relief, etc.) will prolong unemployment indefinitely, and delay the shift of workers to the fields where jobs are available.” [Does anything need added here?]
Rothbard (p. 21) argued these were “time-honored favorites of government policy” and the last part of AGD was devoted to showing how these were the policies adopted in 1929–1933. Current policy has followed the same path. We should not be surprised that the result has been similar, if not as yet quite as tragic. It is still not too late to change paths, but unfortunately such action, while possible is not likely to happen. Neither will the positive actions recommended by Rothbard (p. 22) to speed recovery be undertaken. Reducing the relative role of the government in the economy while reducing taxes, especially those that bear most heavily on saving and investment, are also, as I have argued previously in “Thoughts on Capital-Based Macroeconomics” (Part III), the correct actions to address the debt and size-of-government crisis.
We are again undone by the “Crisis of Authority,” the urge to action, the incorrect, but too often, as explained by Pierre Lemieux, unchallenged belief that Somebody in Charge[1] is a solution to recessions. The correct government depression policy is “Nobody in Charge.” Laissez-faire is thus the untried alternative and the preventative of depression. Sound, free market money is the untried alternative to government money. Laissez-faire and sound money would replace the recurring boom-bust, and its attendant needless depression and unemployment, with sustainable growth and relative prosperity.

Sunday, February 17, 2013

It's a dangerous world







Neil Snyder explicates the conundrum many of us conservatives feel is where we are at present in our political and collective life in America.  In short we are caught between two world views that are simply incompatible.  The one is the progressive view that man is perfectible and providing we put ourselves in the hands of the enlightened elites who know best all will turn out for the best.  This view holds that the perfected society is one in which everyone shares equally in material wealth and that government programs, planning, regulations and direction will see to it that equal outcomes are the rule.  This is collectivism and statism and has been tried and found wanting every time from the USSR's 80-years of communist dictatorship to the reign of terror going on today in North Korea, Cuba and Venezuela for three contemporary examples.  It is a world view base on a false and perverted understanding of human nature and what motivates individuals.  Those who believe in this world view are simply wrong, to put it politely and mildly.  But that doesn't stop them from believing, nor does it stop them from dragging everyone down to their level of inhumanity and degradation of the human soul.  

February 17, 2013

President Obama has set in motion forces that he can't handle. 

Neil Snyder
Barack Obama is a terrible president. That's obvious to everyone who isn't chronically ignorant or incurably liberal.  By "liberal" I don't mean the classic definition of the word which has to do with being open-minded and objective. I mean the modern version of liberal: self-centered, emotional, illogical, and void of reason. Unfortunately, in 2012 ignoramuses and liberals represented the majority of those who voted. I'm not worried about offending them with my harsh words. My very existence offends them, and so does yours if you don't buy into their worldview.
From economic policy to energy policy to environmental policy to foreign affairs to national security to border security to you name it, the president failed the test, but we re-elected him anyway. Obama's misadventures in the Oval Office are becoming the stuff of legend. Benghazi and Fast and Furious are two of his more high profile blunders, but they aren't the only ones. If George W. Bush had committed just one of those offenses, the mainstream media would have demanded his head on a platter, but they gave Obama a free pass. The nation as a whole became complicit in the president's shenanigans because we didn't demand that he be held accountable.
President Obama has done one thing superbly well: he has demonstrated skill par excellence on a national scale as a community organizer. He is second to none when it comes to inciting, agitating, race baiting, stoking fears, and motivating the masses. If you discount voter fraud, more than anything else, those skills got him re-elected. But like a snowball gathering momentum as it rolls down a hill, the forces that he has unleashed will be impossible to stop without pain and suffering.
For example, Occupy Wall Street's demands for social justice dovetailed perfectly with the president's fairness campaign. Was that coincidence or was it by design?  The answer should be obvious, but whatever the case may be, the OWS crowd eventually ran amuck in cities across the fruited plain until government officials finally took action to shut them down. 
That's the way it is with unruly mobs. Once agitators get them started, you never know what will happen. But we do know this: President Obama is their champion, and they are still among us waiting in the wings for another opportunity to vent their frustrations. Will the next version of OWS be more malevolent than the first? Only time will tell, but I wouldn't rule it out.
OWS types aren't alone. In the United States today, large and growing numbers of people believe that their mere existence is their contribution to society. They think that those of us who have worked hard all of our lives owe them a living, and not just a living, but a very good living.  The takers among us are easy pickings for a man with exceptional community organizing skills, and as I said, the forces that the president has unleashed will prove to be impossible to control.  If they explode, there will be hell to pay. 
Common sense is totally absent in their world. For instance, who would dare to suggest that the 1% who paid almost 40% of federal income taxes in 2010 should pay more because it's "fair" even though about 50% of our fellow citizens paid no federal income tax?  The answer: Barack Obama and his merry band of malcontents. If George Orwell were alive today, he would be scratching his head and thinking about a mind-bending plot for another novel.
Takers have no misgivings about attaching themselves permanently to the government tit, and they feel no guilt or shame as they scream for more. Obama knows them and their predilections all too well, and he takes advantage of every opportunity to stoke the fires that burn within them.  The president's mother and his grandparents should have taught him the basics -- things like if you play with matches, you will get burned -- because the fire that he's igniting can easily turn into an inferno.  If it does, all of us will pay a very high price.
In due course, simple mathematics will dictate that we can't afford to keep able bodied men and women on the dole. Our current debt and deficit situation is so dire that something has got to give.  Judging by a recent Gallup poll, most Americans agree with me, but metaphorically speaking, it may take a swift kick in a sensitive area to wake up our elected officials in Washington. Be that as it may, the day is rapidly approaching when no one can ignore our fiscal quagmire because the combination of Medicare, Social Security, and defense spending plus interest on the debt and paying freeloaders threatens to sink this nation.
Reneging on our national debt is out of the question since global pandemonium would ensue.  Obamacare may help to reduce healthcare costs, but when evidence mounts that those "death panels" that we have heard so much about are real and that we are saving money by medicating patients and allowing them to pass away peacefully rather than treating their maladies, people will be hopping mad. Many of them will take to the streets to vent their anger.  If you think that it can't happen here, you haven't been paying attention.
Social Security is a special breed of cat because it involves seniors, a powerful voting block, and it is regarded as a national promise that we must not break. Besides, people actually paid in to Social Security as did their employers so it's an annuity -- and not a very good one at that.  Any politician who thinks that he can safely tamper with Social Security isn't playing with a full deck of cards. Even so, we can't solve our debt and deficit problems unless we make adjustments in Social Security and Medicare. It's the quintessential Catch 22.
Similarly, we need to cut defense spending without jeopardizing our national security, but defense reductions translate into job cuts and that creates another set of problems. No matter what we do, people will not be happy with the outcome, and many of them will vent their frustration in the voting booth and possibly on the streets.
This is the point: a perfect storm is brewing. I think we're heading for a chaotic and violent period in this country the likes of which no one alive today has ever witnessed.  If I'm right, conditions will be ideal for criminals to ply their craft, and President Obama is pushing for gun control at precisely the wrong moment. 
I believe that what I have described is realistic and unfortunately inevitable, and that brings me back to my back to the president.  He has set in motion forces that he can't handle, and all of us are going to suffer the consequences so get ready for a wild ride.

Neil Snyder is the Ralph A. Beeton Professor Emeritus at the University of Virginia.  His blog, SnyderTalk.com, is posted daily.


Read more: http://www.americanthinker.com/blog/2013/02/president_obama_has_set_in_motion_forces_that_he_cant_handle.html#ixzz2LCQWUxiP
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