Thursday, February 7, 2013

How Austrian economics is right



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[This talk was delivered on January 26, 2013, at the Jeremy S. Davis Mises Circle in Houston, Texas.]
In December, it will be 100 years since Congress authorized the creation of the Federal Reserve System. Throughout that century the Fed has enjoyed broad bipartisan support. That’s another way of saying the Fed never appeared on the political radar until Ron Paul broke the rules by actually campaigning against it in 2007.
The Fed was supposed to provide stability to the financial sector and the economy at large. We are supposed to believe it has been a wonderful success. A glance at the headlines over the past five years renders an unkind verdict on this rarely examined assumption.
Last year we observed another important centenary—the 100-year anniversary of the publication of Ludwig von Mises’s pathbreaking book, The Theory of Money and Credit, written when the great economist was just 31. The end of an era was approaching as that book reached the public. A century of sound money, albeit with exceptions here and there, was drawing to a close. It had likewise been a century of peace, or at least without a continent-wide war, since the Congress of Vienna. Both of these happy trends came to an abrupt end for the same reason: the outbreak in 1914 of World War I, the great cataclysm of Western civilization.
It was as though Mises had one eye to the past, speaking of the merits of a monetary system which—while not perfectly laissez-faire—had served the world so well for so long, and another eye to the future, as he warned of the consequences of tampering with or abandoning that system. Mises carefully dismantled the inflationist doctrines that were to ravage much of the world during the twentieth century.
The book covered the whole expanse of monetary theory, including money and its origins, interest rates, time preference, banking, credit, inflation, deflation, exchange rates, and business cycles.
Most important for our topic today was Mises’s warning to the world’s monetary authorities not to suppress the market rate of interest in the name of creating prosperity. The failure to heed Mises’s advice, indeed the full-fledged ignorance or outright defiance of that advice, is the monetary story of the twentieth century.
The single most arresting economic event of the Fed’s century was surely the Great Depression. This was supposed to have discredited laissez-faire and the free economy for good. Wild speculation was said to have created a stock-market bubble, and the bust in 1929 was what the unregulated market had allegedly wrought. Other critics said the problem had been the free market’s unfair distribution of wealth: the impoverished masses simply couldn’t afford to buy what the stores had for sale. In later years, even so-called free-marketeers would blame the Depression on too little intervention into the market by the Federal Reserve. (With friends like these, who needs enemies?)
Ludwig von Mises offered a different explanation, as did F.A. Hayek, Lionel Robbins, and other scholars working in the Austrian tradition in those days. Murray N. Rothbard, in turn, would devote his 1962 book America’s Great Depression to an Austrian analysis of this misunderstood episode.
The study of business cycles differs from the study of economic hard times. Economic conditions can be poor because of war, a natural disaster, or some other calamity that disrupts the normal functioning of the market. Business cycle research is not interested in those kinds of conditions. It seeks to understand economic boom and bust when none of these obvious factors are present.
Mises referred to his own approach as the circulation credit theory of the business cycle. For our purposes, we can describe it in brief.
On the free market, when people increase their saving, that increased saving has two important consequences. First, it lowers interest rates. These lower interest rates, in turn, make it possible for entrepreneurs to pursue a range of long-term investment projects profitably, thanks to the lower cost of financing. Second, the act of saving and thus abstaining from spending on consumer goods, releases resources that these entrepreneurs can use to complete their new projects. If consumer-goods industries no longer need quite so many resources, since (as we stipulated at the start) people are buying fewer consumer goods, those released resources provide the physical wherewithal to carry out the long-term production projects that the lower interest rates encouraged entrepreneurs to initiate.
Note that it is decisions and actions by the public that provide the means for this capital expansion. "If the public does not provide these means," Mises explains, "they cannot be conjured up by the magic of banking tricks."
But "banking tricks" are precisely how the Fed tries to stimulate the economy. The Fed lowers interest rates artificially, without an increase in saving on the part of the public, and without a corresponding release of resources. The public has not made available the additional means of production necessary to make the array of long-term production projects profitable. The boom will therefore be abortive, and the bust becomes inevitable.
In short, interest rates on a free market reflect people’s willingness to abstain from immediate consumption and thereby make resources available for business expansion. They give the entrepreneur an idea of how far, and in what ways, he may expand. Market interest rates help entrepreneurs distinguish between projects that are appropriate to the current state of resource availability, and projects that are not, projects that the public is willing to sustain by its saving and projects that they are not.
The central bank confuses this process when it intervenes in the market to lower interest rates. As Mises put it:
The policy of artificially lowering the rate of interest below its potential market height seduces the entrepreneurs to embark upon certain projects of which the public does not approve. In the market economy, each member of society has his share in determining the amount of additional investment. There is no means of fooling the public all of the time by tampering with the rate of interest. Sooner or later, the public’s disapproval of a policy of over-expansion takes effect. Then the airy structure of the artificial prosperity collapses.
None of these cycles will be exactly like any other. Roger Garrison says the artificial boom will tend to latch on to and distort whatever the big thing at the time happens to be—tech stocks in the 1990s, for example, and housing in the most recent boom.
With this theoretical apparatus as a guide, Mises became convinced as the 1920s wore on that the seeds of a bust were being sown. This was not a fashionable position. Irving Fisher, a godfather of modern neoclassical economics and the man Milton Friedman called the greatest American economist, could see nothing but continued growth and prosperity in his own survey of economic conditions at the time. In fact, Fisher’s predictions in the late 1920s, even in the very midst of the crash, are downright embarrassing.
On September 5, 1929, Fisher wrote: "There may be a recession in stock prices, but not anything in the nature of a crash … the possibility of which I fail to see."
In mid-October, Fisher said stocks had reached a "permanently high plateau." He expected "to see the stock market a good deal higher than it is today within a few months." He did "not feel that there will soon, if ever, be a fifty- or sixty-point break below present levels."
On October 22 Fisher was speaking of "a mild bull market that will gain momentum next year." With the stock market crashing and values plummeting all around him—with declines far more severe than Fisher had been prepared to admit were even conceivable—Fisher on November 3 insisted that stock prices were "absurdly low." But they would go much lower, ultimately losing 90 percent of their peak value.
What had gone so horribly wrong? Fisher and his colleagues had been blinded by their assumptions. They had been looking at the "price level" and at economic growth figures to determine the health of the economy. They concluded that the 1920s were a period of solid, sustainable economic progress, and were taken completely by surprise by the onset and persistence of the Depression.
Mises, on the other hand, was not fooled by the 1920s. For Mises and the Austrians, crude aggregates of the kind Fisher consulted were not suitable for ascertaining the condition of the economy. To the contrary, these macro-level measurements concealed the economy-wide micro-level maladjustments that resulted from the artificial credit expansion. The misdirection of resources into unsustainable projects, and the expansion or creation of stages of production that the economy cannot sustain, do not show up in national income accounting figures. What matters is that interest rates were pushed lower than they would otherwise have been, thereby leading the economy into an unsustainable configuration that had to be reversed in a bust.
Thus Mises wrote in 1928:
It is clear that the crisis must come sooner or later. It is also clear that the crisis must always be caused, primarily and directly, by the change in the conduct of the banks. If we speak of error on the part of the banks, however, we must point to the wrong they do in encouraging the upswing. The fault lies, not with the policy of raising the interest rate, but only with the fact that it was raised too late.
Once the crisis hit, Mises showed how his theory of business cycles accounted for what was happening. If people could understand how the crash had come about, Mises hoped, they would be less likely to exacerbate the problem with counterproductive government policy.
"The Causes of the Economic Crisis" was the title of an address Ludwig von Mises delivered in late February 1931 to a group of German industrialists. It was unknown to English-speaking audiences until 1978, when it was published as a chapter in a collection of Mises’s essays called On the Manipulation of Money and Credit. The Mises Institute published a new edition of these essays in 2006 under the title The Causes of the Economic Crisis: And Other Essays Before and After the Great Depression.
In that essay Mises was characteristically blunt in describing the causes of the Great Depression, as well as in his warnings that such crises would recur as long as the authorities continued to pursue the same destructive courses of action.
The crisis from which we are now suffering is … the outcome of a credit expansion. The present crisis is the unavoidable sequel to a boom. Such a crisis necessarily follows every boom generated by the attempt to reduce the "natural rate of interest" through increasing the fiduciary media [in other words, through creating credit out of thin air].
As we have seen at this event today, the crisis whose wreckage we see all around us right now, a crisis that began in 2008, originated from the same interventions Mises warned against a century ago. Mises would not have been surprised by the Panic of 2008. In 1931, he warned of a recurrence of boom-bust cycles if the policy of artificially low interest rates was not abandoned:
The appearance of periodically recurring economic crises is the necessary consequence of repeatedly renewed attempts to reduce the "natural" rates of interest on the market by means of banking policy. The crises will never disappear so long as men have not learned to avoid such pump-priming, because an artificially stimulated boom must inevitably lead to crisis and depression. …
All attempts to emerge from the crisis by new interventionist measures are completely misguided. There is only one way out of the crisis. … Give up the pursuit of policies which seek to establish interest rates, wage rates, and commodity prices different from those the market indicates.
In the 1920s as now, fashionable opinion could see no major crisis coming. Then as now, the public was assured that the experts at the Fed were smoothing out economic fluctuations and deserved credit for bringing about unprecedented prosperity. And then as now, when the bust came, the free market took the blame for what the Federal Reserve had caused.
It is fitting that a century of the Federal Reserve should come to an end at a moment of economic crisis and uncertainty, with the central bank’s leadership confused and in disarray after the economy’s failure to respond to unprecedented doses of monetary intervention. The century of the Fed has been a century of depression, recession, inflation, financial bubbles, and unsound banking, and its legacy is the precipice on which our economy now precariously rests.
Faced with a slow-motion train wreck they feel helpless to stop, people often ask what they can do.
There are no easy answers, to be sure. But one thing is certain: there will be no progress without the spread of knowledge.
I hope you’ll be a part of the crucial and historic moment that lies before us.
Thanks in large part to Ron Paul, recent years have seen a spectacular revival of interest in the Austrian School of economics and in particular its theory of the business cycle. This is a deeply significant and most welcome development. Until recently, even supporters of the free market had by and large ignored the Federal Reserve, or even thought of it as a potentially stabilizing force in a capitalist economy. The possibility that its interventions into the market may actually have been destabilizing, and actually have been the cause of the boom-bust cycle, was hardly to be heard anywhere. Were you to say such a thing at an ostensibly free-market conference, chances were slim that you would appear on the following year’s program.
For more than 30 years, however, the Mises Institute has been dedicated to the pursuit of economic science in the Austrian tradition. We’ve warned against the economic damage caused by central banking at a time when that message couldn’t have been less fashionable. You’ve already seen some of the results of our work here this weekend: three of our speakers—Peter Klein, Bob Murphy, and Tom Woods—came through the Institute’s programs during their college years.
But now, with the vastly increased demand for what we offer, we want to step things up. Way up.
One of our primary goals is to carry out what we’re calling Operation Ron Paul. We want to equip the masses of young people drawn to the Austrian School by Ron’s heroic work with the skills, resources, and knowledge they’ll need in order to keep the Austrian School and Ron’s message vital and growing.
We are also setting up an Economic Crisis Project, to be ready now and when the next event hits, with the scholarly and popular explanations of what happened, and what to do about it.
What is attractive about the market economy is not simply what it accomplishes materially: ever-higher standards of living, prosperity for the masses that the most exalted monarchs of yore could scarcely have imagined for themselves, and the ability to support far larger populations than anyone centuries ago could have dreamed. This is all great cause for celebration, to be sure. But what the beautiful order of the market shows is the staggering, near-miraculous achievements of mankind by means of voluntary cooperation, and without state violence or an exalted leader ordering people around.
Set against this marvelous spectacle, the government-privileged central bank is a grotesque anomaly. To say that we need a politically created monopoly to create money, the commodity that constitutes one-half of every non-barter transaction, is to say that the market economy is not really so impressive or effective after all. If we must conjure a specially privileged monopoly to create this most essential commodity, and if that monopoly is likewise given the task of managing the economy to maximize employment and output, then we are in principle abandoning the whole case for the free market and conceding the value of central planning.
We do not need any such monopoly, as the work of the Austrian economists makes clear, and we do not need any form of central planning. We need the free market, which is another way of saying we need to let people make their own decisions, enter into the agreements of their choice, and be secure in their private property.
The Austrian School is enjoying its most spectacular surge in growth in its entire history. A generation of smart young people are reading everything they can find on Austrian economics. The Austrian diagnosis of the economic crisis is so widespread that even establishment writers and economists have been forced to engage with it.
Let’s make sure this surge doesn’t fizzle out. If we build on these early successes, if we carry forward the message of the Austrian School relentlessly and courageously, we can make the next hundred years a Misesian century of peace, sound money, and liberty. Please join us.

Sunday, February 3, 2013

Do we need the income tax?


Do we need the income tax to manage a modern society?  This is a valid and important question that is addressed here by Dan Mitchell.  He's right that the more revenue the state takes in, the more politicians have to redistribute and buy votes to keep themselves in office.  Clearly increasing revenues means bigger government, and bigger government means more laws and regulations and control over the individual's life.  Either you want a society in which individual responsibility and freedom are paramount, or you don't.  There's no compromising in this issue.  

The 100th Anniversary of the Income Tax…and the Lesson We Should Learn from that Mistake

What’s the worst thing about Delaware?
No, not Joe Biden. He’s just a harmless clown and the butt of some good jokes.
Instead, the so-called First State is actually the Worst State because 100 years ago, on this very day, Delaware made the personal income tax possible by ratifying the 16th Amendment.
Though, to be fair, I suppose the 35 states that already had ratified the Amendment were more despicable since they were even more anxious to enable this noxious levy (and Alabama was first in line, which is a further sign that Georgia deserved to win the Southeastern Conference Championship Game, but I digress).
Let’s not get bogged down in details. The purpose of this post is not to re-hash history, but to instead ask what lessons we can learn from the adoption of the income tax.
The most obvious lesson is that politicians can’t be trusted with additional powers. The first income tax had a top tax rate of just 7 percent and the entire tax code was 400 pages long. Now we have a top tax rate of 39.6 percent (even higher if you include additional levies for Medicare and Obamacare) and the tax code has become a 72,000-page monstrosity.
But the main lesson I want to discuss today is that giving politicians a new source of money inevitably leads to much higher spending.
Here’s a chart, based on data from the Office of Management and Budget, showing the burden of federal spending since 1789.
Since OMB only provides aggregate spending data for the 1789-1849 and 1850-190 periods, which would mean completely flat lines on my chart, I took some wild guesses about how much was spent during the War of 1812 and the Civil War in order to make the chart look a bit more realistic.
But that’s not very important. What I want people to notice is that we enjoyed a very tiny federal government for much of our nation’s history. Federal spending would jump during wars, but then it would quickly shrink back to a very modest level – averaging at most 3 percent of economic output.
Federal Spending 1789-2012
So what’s the lesson to learn from this data? Well, you’ll notice that the normal pattern of government shrinking back to its proper size after a war came to an end once the income tax was adopted.
In the pre-income tax days, the federal government had to rely on tariffs and excise taxes, and those revenues were incapable of generating much revenue for the government, both because of political resistance (tariffs were quite unpopular in agricultural states) and Laffer Curve reasons (high tariffs and excise taxes led to smuggling and noncompliance).
But once the politicians had a new source of revenue, they couldn’t resist the temptation to grab more money. And then we got a ratchet effect, with government growing during wartime, but then never shrinking back to its pre-war level once hostilities ended (Robert Higgs wrote a book about this unfortunate phenomenon).
The same thing happened in Europe. The burden of government spending used to be quite modest on the other side of the Atlantic, with outlays consuming only about 10 percent of economic output.
Once European politicians got the income tax, however, that also enabled a big increase is the size of the state.
But Europe also gives us a very good warning about the dangers of giving politicians a second major source of revenue.
Here’s a chart I prepared for a study published when I was at the Heritage Foundation. You’ll notice from 1960-1970 that the overall burden of government spending in Europe was not that different than it was in the United States.
That’s about the time, however, that the European governments began to imposevalue-added taxes.
The rest, as they say, is history.
VAT and Govt Spending in EU
I’m not claiming, by the way, that the VAT is the only reason why the burden of government spending expanded in Europe. The Europeans also impose harsher payroll taxes and higher energy taxes. And their income taxes tend to be much more onerous for middle-income households.
But I am arguing that the VAT helped enable bigger government in Europe, just like the income tax decades earlier also enabled bigger government in both Europe and the United States.
So ask yourself a simple question: If we allow politicians in Washington to impose a VAT on top of the income tax, do you think they’ll use the money to expand the size and scope of government?
If it takes more than three seconds to answer that question, I suggest you emigrate to France as quickly as possible.
P.S. You probably won’t be surprised to learn that the crazy bureaucrats at the Paris-based OECD think the VAT is good for growth and jobs. Sort of makes you wonder why we’re subsidizing those statists with American tax dollars.

Henry Morganthau and The Great Depression

From Jim Taranto's column comes this bit of nonsense about messaging and vision and transformation and on and on. It's hard to know where to begin to comment on the thoughts expressed here because they are so confused and lacking in relevance.  For example some commenter makes the point Obama compares unfavorably to FDR for "failing to single out "villains" including "Wall Street gamblers", "conservative extremists"and George W. Bush ...".  What's wrong with this "observation", at least to those of us who have read historians other than those who deified FDR and his misguided New Deal, is the fact that by any reasonably thought out standards, the New Deal was a colossal failure.  Consider this 1939 quote (10 years after the Crash of 1929 and the onset of the Great Depression) from one of its architects and key administrators, Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau:


“We have tried spending money. We are spending more than we have ever spent before and it does not work. And I have just one interest, and now if I am wrong somebody else can have my job. I want to see this country prosper. I want to see people get a job. I want to see people get enough to eat. We have never made good on our promises. I say after eight years of this administration, we have just as much unemployment as when we started. And enormous debt to boot.”
So, dingbat commenters think Obama should model himself after a president whose policies prolonged the Great Recession into a ten-year nightmare and like FDR should demonize his opponents more in order to rally the American people more to his cause.  Anyone who can to explain the logic of this thinking deserves an advanced degree in philosophy.

Jim Taranto comments:
Drew Westen, a psychologist cum political tactician, who in a lengthy and much-discussed (including in this column) New York Times op-ed faulted the president for having failed to tell "a story the American people were waiting to hear--and needed to hear." Westen compared Obama unfavorably to FDR, faulting him for failing to single out "villains" including "Wall Street gamblers," "conservative extremists" and George W. Bush and for not beginning his presidency by making clear his intention to steamroll congressional Republicans, back when that was an option. In response, Time's Joe Klein enthused:
Obama is often eloquent. . . . But he has never deployed these skills in service of the larger story--never really explained where we are as a country, how we got here and--Westen is spot on here--who the villains have been. He has never gone to war on behalf of the American people. . . .
[Obama and Jimmy Carter] do share a trait: an inability to tell a story. The most popular stories have good guys and bad guys. If he wants to be re-elected, Obama is going to have to start telling us who the bad guys are and what he plans to do about them.
Obama won re-election, but would anyone really describe the 2012 Obama campaign as a clinic in exegetical politics? Did Obama lay out a compelling case for his principles? Far from it. In fact, his clearest ideological statement was "You didn't build that." His supporters spent weeks insisting he didn't say that.
What Obama did do successfully was vilify his opponent ("not one of us") and make narrow, often fear-based appeals to particular interest groups. His campaign also demonstrated a mastery of technology for identifying voters and coaxing them to the polls.

Taranto concludes:  So maybe conservatives should snap out of it. If the left emerged triumphant from the slough of despond in barely a year, there's no reason the right can't do it too. But it's no clearer now than it was then that the answer lies in better "messaging." (Incidentally, maybe if you want to message good, you shouldn't use nouns as verbs.) And talking about the need for better messaging isn't going to win any elections. To be sure, neither is writing about talking about messaging. But we promise never to run for anything.



Money and the banking system

Sooner or later we, society, is going to have to deal with the monetary system now in the hands and control of the FRS.  Clearly the FRS has made a mess of managing currency otherwise we would not have all these recessions, depressions and uncertainties brought about by interference by managers in the free market order.  Here follows an enlightening article on this subject:


Banking and the State

Mises Daily: Friday, February 01, 2013 by 
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“It had come to be accepted that the pigs, who were manifestly cleverer than the other animals, should decide all questions of farm policy, though their decisions had to be ratified by a majority vote.”
Orwell, G. (1989 [1945]), Animal Farm, S. 34.

The Starting Point: Civilization Begins

The founder of the Medici banking dynasty, Giovanni di Bicci de' Medici (1360–1429), said to his children on his death bed: “Stay out of the public eye.”[1] His words raise the question, "How much do bankers know about the truth of modern money and banking?"
To develop a meaningful answer to this question in the tradition of the Austrian School of economics, one has to start right at the beginning, and that is with the process of civilization.
Civilization denotes the development through which man substitutes the state of the division of labor and specialization (that is, peaceful and productive cooperation) for the state of subsistence (that is, a violent hand-to-mouth existence).
In his magnum opus Human Action (1949), Ludwig von Mises (1881–1973) put forward a praxeological explanation of the process of civilization, which helps us understand the course of its evolution.[2]
To Mises, two factors are at the heart of the process of civilization: (1) There must be an inequality of wants and skills among people. This is a necessary condition for people to want to seek cooperation.
(2) Man must recognize that higher productivity is possible through a division of labor. Mises thus assumes – as a necessary condition – a minimum intelligence among human beings and a willingness to use this intelligence in practical life.

Money Emerges – Carl Menger's Theory of the Origin of Money

The inequality of skills and wants, accompanied with the assumption of a minimum intelligence, leads people to engage in the division of labor and specialization. This, in turn, brings about theneed for interpersonal exchange.
The primitive form of an exchange economy is barter. Barter has limitations, however. For instance, under barter, exchange opportunities depend on a double coincidence of wants.
Sooner or later, people (assuming a minimum of intelligence) will realize that using an indirect means of exchange is economically beneficial.
Using an indirect means of exchange increases the opportunities for exchange, as the double coincidence of wants is no longer a requisite for making trading possible.
The indirect means of exchange that becomes universally accepted is called "money."
In Principles of Economics (1871), Carl Menger (1840–1921) theorizes that money emerges spontaneously from market activities, and that free market money emerges out of a commodity (such as precious metals).[3]
Mises later showed with his regression theorem that this must indeed be so, for praxeological reasons: Money must have emerged out of a market; and it must have started out as a commodity.[4]

Money Warehousing

Money is an economic good like any other. As such, it will be economized, like any other good.
People will demand convenient ways of holding and exchanging their money proper.
With people differing in individual time preference, there will be savers (those who hold excess balances of money proper) and investors (those who demand money proper in excess of their actual holdings).[5]
It is against this backdrop that two kinds of money businesses would emerge in the free market: deposit banking (or money warehousing) and loan, or credit, banking.[6]
Deposit banking offers custodian, safeguarding and settlement services to holders of money proper. For instance, holders of money proper can deposit their commodity money with a deposit bank against receiving a money certificate (in the form of a banknote or a sight deposit).
Credit banks would refinance themselves by obtaining genuine savings, that is by issuing interest-bearing bonds. Savers will willingly exchange their money proper against such return-yielding bonds.
The market interest rate will be determined by the supply of and demand for money proper, and so the equilibrium market interest rate will reflect the societal time preference rate. In other words, In a free market, there will quite naturally be a profession which we may call “bankers”: some bankers will work in the money warehousing business (or deposit banking), some in credit banking.
To be sure: In a free market deposit banking and credit institutions will represent legally separate entities, and so we would have the deposit banker, and we would have the credit banker.

The Incentive for Aggression

In a free market, there are only three ways of acquiring property (that is, in a non-aggressive way): homesteading (which actually denotes the “first-user-first-owner principle”), production, and voluntary contracting.
In reality, however, things may be somewhat different.
Franz Oppenheimer pointed out that “There are two fundamentally opposed means whereby man, requiring sustenance, is impelled to obtain the necessary means for satisfying his desires. These are work and robbery, one's own labor and the forcible appropriation of the labor of others.” [7]
The logic of human action tells us that there is – in fact, there must be – for the individual an economic incentive to aggress against other peoples’ property. Two interrelated praxeological insights explain this.
First, we know for sure that an earlier satisfaction is preferred over a later satisfaction of wants; we also know for sure that a satisfaction of wants associated with low costs is preferred over a satisfaction of wants associated with high costs. In other words, individuals try to achieve their ends with as little input as possible and in the shortest period of time.
Second, the process to civilization does not extirpate man’s inclination to aggression. Individual A can be expected to aggress against B (that is against B’s property) if and when he gets away with it—that is, if the (expected) benefits for A from aggressing against B will be higher than the (expected) costs he has to bear by doing so.
It is the individual’s economic incentive to aggress against other peoples’ property that is at the heart of the emergence of what is typically called "government."
A government can be understood as a territorial monopolist of compulsion: an agency that engages in institutionalized property rights violations and the exploitation – in the form of expropriation, taxation, and regulation – of private property owners.[8]
To answer the question, "What do bankers know about the truth about money and banking?", it is necessary to take a closer look at the various forms of government.
To start with, one can make a distinction between governments with a low time preference and governments with high time preference.
At one end of the spectrum is, to borrow a criminal metaphor from Mancur L. Olson (1932–1998), theroving bandit.[9] The roving bandit represents a form of government that has a limited interest in the welfare of society and, as a result, his theft typically approaches 100 percent of society’s income.
The roving bandit does not have to share in the damage his aggression causes to society (in terms of lost income). The time preference of the roving bandit is therefore relatively high. He takes as much from his victims as possible, and there is next to no economic incentive to restrain his stealing.
At other end of the spectrum is the stationary bandit. Like the roving bandit, he also holds the monopoly of coercion over his victims.
However, the stationary bandit has an encompassing interest in society’s welfare. He wishes to keep his victims producing: the more his victims produce, the more there is to take for the stationary bandit.
Sharing in society’s losses, the stationary bandit will make sure that his thievery is limited. The higher the losses in production from thievery are, the lower will be the level of aggression at which the stationary bandit’s take is maximized. The stationary bandit’s time preference will therefore be lower than the time preference of the roving bandit.
Taking a closer look at the stationary bandit, one can make a distinction between private ownership of government (feudalism/monarchy) and public ownership of government (democratic-republicanism).[10]
The caretaker of a privately held government maximizes the present value of the total income which results from expropriating the property of the ruled.
A monarch, for instance, holds the monopoly of expropriation over his victims, and his time preference will be, due to his encompassing interest, relatively low.
In contrast, the caretaker of a publicly owned government will maximize his current income. His time preference will therefore be relatively high.
Public ownership of government means majority voting. The majority of the people decides about who will serve as the temporary caretaker of public ownership of government.
The average voter will support those politicians who are expected (rightly or wrongly) to improve the voter’s economic situation. A voter has every economic incentive to act in this way – irrespective of the fact that the income he may obtain in this way results from expropriating fellow citizens.
The caretaker of public ownership of government, in turn, has an incentive to secure the majority of the voters. He will favor policies of expropriating the (typically few) high income producers to the benefits of the (typically large group) of less productive or nonproductive people.
The important insight here is as follows: public ownership of government will lead to an ongoing erosion of the encompassing interest of the majority of the people in the market income of society, or in other words, society’s time preference will increase.

Government Brings Fraudulent Banking

The rise in society’s time preference is the central explanatory factor for explaining the emergence of fraudulent banking, which is epitomized by a pure fiat money regime.
We know that the caretakers of publicly owned government wish to expropriate resources from the public at large. This can be done most conveniently by (1) obtaining control over money production, (2) replacing commodity money with fiat money, and (3) producing money through credit expansion.
The banking industry and the bankers are therefore the natural ally for government’s planned thievery. In fact, those in government and the bankers will, and logically so, collude for establishing a pure fiat money system.
Bankers realize that they would earn additional revenue if and when they are allowed to issue new money balances through credit expansion (or ex nihilo): making loans beyond the amount of money proper available to them.
They understand that such fractional reserve banking is a fairly profitable undertaking to them, and so the deposit as well as the loan banker will be in favor of merging deposit banking with loan banking.
The temporary caretakers of publicly owned governments are very much in favor of fractional reserve banking, too. Being a first receiver of the new money, government can expropriate resources from the natural owners of things.
Having monopolized the law, it will be relatively easy for government to declare fractional reserve banking legal.
Engaging in fractional reserve banking, however, is risky for the banker. He knows that if and when his counterfeiting is detected, a bank run may ensue, and he would be forced out of business, or worse.
For government, bank failures are fairly undesirable, too. It would bring severe political and economic problems. Most important, defaulting banks endanger access to credit and money on easy terms.
Government will therefore, greatly supported by the bankers, set up a central bank, which will enable and greatly encourage all banks to inflate the quantity of money in a combined effort.
Even with a central bank in place, however, the risk of a bank run is not entirely eliminated. What is needed is for the central bank to have a monopoly over money production.
This is why sooner or later commodity money will be replaced by irredeemable paper, or fiat, money; and fiat money will be granted legal privileges (such as, for instance, legal tender status). To this end, government will make it legal for bankers to suspend the redeemability of outstanding money certificates into money proper.

Collective Corruption

One may wonder: How do government and bankers get away with this – that is fraudulently extracting resources from producers and contractors via issuing inflationary money?
Is it a lack of knowledge on the part of those who are on the losing end of the counterfeiting money regime? Or are the costs of revolting against a pure fiat money regime prohibitively high from the viewpoint of the individual?
An economically reasonable, that is praxeological, answer to this question can be found with (what I call) “collective corruption.” [11]
Once government intervenes in society’s (monetary) affairs, individuals will increasingly develop a disposition for violating other peoples’ property.
By taking advantage of governmental coercive action, an individual can reap the benefits from aggressing against the property of others, while he has to bear only a fraction of the damage his action does to society as a whole.
He has every incentive to act in this way; he would have to bear the losses of whatever opportunity for violating other’s private property he passes up.
A pure fiat money system, once it has set into motion, will lead to collective corruption on the presumably grandest scale.
As is well known, government can secure its support by letting the public at large (actually parts of it) share in the enjoyment of the receipts fraudulently extracted from natural owners of things.
For instance, government will offer reasonably-paid jobs (in particular for the intellectuals and second-hand dealer of ideas). It will also provide firms with public contracts (such as, for instance, for construction and building projects).
With growing government handouts, a growing number of people and businesses will become economically and socially dependent on the continuation (or even further expansion) of government activity.
Quite naturally, resistance against a further expansion of government and the fiat money regime – which necessarily means further violation of individuals’ property rights – will decline.
Clearly, bankers play an important role in spreading collective corruption. It may suffice here to say that a growing number of people will start investing their lifetime savings into fiat-denominated bank deposits and bonds.
Sooner or later people will develop a great interest in supporting government and upholding the fiat money regime – by whatever means deemed necessary.

It Will End in Hyperinflation

Collective corruption, once it has become sufficiently widespread, will lead to hyperinflation – meaning an accelerating increase in the quantity of money, leading to an erosion, or even a total destruction, of the purchasing power of fiat money.
Of course, those in government and bankers have a common interest in avoiding hyperinflation. They prefer a kind of inflation that goes on basically unnoticed, a form of inflation that won't spin out of control.
However, once collective corruption has become widespread and the banking and financial industry has become highly important in terms of financing government and serving as an important hoard for individuals' lifetime savings, the pendulum has already been swung toward hyperinflation.
From praxeology, we know for sure that a fiat money boom will ultimately end in depression. We also know that efforts to escape depression by increasing the quantity of fiat money even further will only postpone the day of reckoning, and that it will raise the costs of the depression in the future.
How will the majority of the people respond to an approaching depression? If and when people can expect to rank among the first receivers of the newly created money (which is actually the case once collective corruption has become sufficiently widespread), the answer appears to be obvious.
The majority of the people may expect to benefit from running the electronic printing press, and they will prefer the running of the electronic printing press over letting government and banks default. Under such an incentive structure the fiat money system would end up in hyperinflation.
In view of what has been said above we can conclude: (1) If and when public ownership of government takes hold, commodity money will be replaced by fiat money. (2) Fiat money leads to collective corruption on a grand scale. And (3), once collective corruption has become sufficiently widespread, the fiat money regime will be destroyed by hyperinflation.
From what has been said above it follows that we know that once a fiat money system has been put in place, banks and bankers have joined – some of them willingly and knowingly, some of them unknowingly – the vast criminal enterprise that is the state.
Being self-interested human beings, bankers can, and must, be expected to know a lot about money and banking. In view of a rather dismal monetary history, such a conclusion would also do much to explain Giovanni di Bicci de' Medici’s dying words to his children: “Stay out of the public eye.”